

WIELDING SOFT POWER THROUGH THE KONG ZI INSTITUTE

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the effectiveness of Kong Zi Institute University of Malaya (KZIUM) roles as an instrument of China's soft power from Malaysia's point of view. Language and culture are undoubtedly one of the most effective soft power's tools. Over the past decade, the institute expanded its activities and cooperation not only within the main campus but to all parts of Malaysia. Data were retrieved from participant observation, interviews and KZIUM annual reports from 2018 to 2019. This article aims to provide a profound understanding of how China has been using KZIUM to boost its image and soft power through language learning and cultural activities. This article shows that the increasing number of students proves KZIUM had gained recognition as a platform for learning Chinese and as a bridge in linking Malaysia-China cultural exchange. With thorough analysis, it can be concluded that KZIUM has been playing crucial roles in exerting soft power in Malaysia through language and culture. However, the effectiveness of this foreign policy will be regarded in the future.

Keyword: Kong Zi Institute, soft power, Hanban, Chinese Bridge Competition

INTRODUCTION

Prior to China's economic reform in 1979, China has become one of the world's fastest-growing economy and had left a huge influence on other developing countries. Although China's phenomenal rising significantly impact its global affairs, it still lacks soft power. Eventually, since the early 1990s, China came to understand the importance of soft power to convey its foreign policy. Through Joseph Nye's soft power concept, the Chinese officials and scholars have translated and elaborated the definition of soft power, emphasising culture and calls it 'Cultural Soft Power'.¹ The use of soft power was then intensified under the leadership of President Xi Jinping in which he applied to achieve among his few initiatives especially the Belt and Road Initiative and "China Dream" objectives.

China's continuous economic rise subsequently sparked interest within foreign communities to learn

Chinese. To fulfil the demands of learning Chinese abroad, China established the Chinese Language Council International or officially known as Office of Chinese Language Council International or *Hanban*² (汉办) in 1987. *Hanban*'s most notable project, the Confucius Institute (CI), was first launched in November 2004 in Seoul, South Korea, a few months after establishing a pilot institute in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Its primary missions are to teach the Chinese language, promote Chinese culture, and enhance the development of multiculturalism.³ The Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes further explained that the Confucius Institute role is not only to popularise its culture and language but mostly:

"... to satisfy the demands of people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to enhance understanding of the Chinese language and culture, to strengthen educational and cultural exchange and cooperation

between China and other countries, to deepen friendly relationships and to promoting the development of multiculturalism.”⁴

The primary aims of the CI are to teach Chinese, to provide cultural understanding and to facilitate business. Since its establishment in 2004, the Confucius Institute had sprouted all over the world, mainly in United States, Japan, and South Korea. As of 2019, a total of 162 countries and regions have established 550 Confucius Institutes and 1172 classrooms worldwide.⁵ According to the Confucius Institute Headquarter, there are 30,000 primary and secondary schools around the world have set up Chinese language courses; 4000 universities have Chinese language departments or courses; 45,000 Chinese language schools and training institutions offer Chinese language education, with a total of 25 million people learning Chinese all over the world.⁶ *Hanban* provides start-up funding of US\$150,000, annual stipend of US\$100,000, teaching staffs and their salaries, and teaching materials. In contrast, host institution generally provides space and administration support to manage the Confucius Institute⁷. Though the Confucius Institute is spreading and expanding fast around the globe, it has subsequently become China’s “international brand” to promote its language culture.

CHINA'S SOFT POWER

In recent decades, the use of soft power in a country’s diplomatic approach is crucial and helps to strengthen a country’s influence. The concept of soft power was popularised by Professor Joseph Nye in his 1990 book, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. In this book, he defines soft power as “when one country gets other countries to want what it wants, might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants⁸”. According to Nye, soft power is the ability to attract and persuade others without force or coercion. Nye mentioned in his book a country’s soft power relies mainly on three resources: its culture, its political values, and its foreign policies.⁹ Commonly known for their use of hard power, China came to understand the importance of having soft power in conveying its foreign policy. China believes that it is not going to be a major global power unless

it has the ability to attract.¹⁰ Thus, soft power had become a priority among the Chinese policymakers especially after President Hu Jintao explicitly referred soft power in the national government policy at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2007.¹¹ In his speech he announced that:

“We must enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country... We will further publicise in the fine traditions of Chinese culture and strengthen international cultural exchanges to enhance the influence of Chinese culture worldwide”.¹²

China spares no effort in conveying its policy, spending millions of dollars on increasing its image abroad. Among the most noticeable actions in the next years were the internationalisation of the Chinese media, the strengthening of Chinese movies and the spreading of the Confucius Institute.¹³ The Chinese believed that only through cultural soft power can they strengthen communication with people around the world. In 2014, Hu Jintao’s successor, President Xi Jinping began to intensify the use of soft power. He said at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China that:

“We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s message to the world”.¹⁴

Following Hu’s footsteps, President Xi introduced a few initiatives: “The Chinese Dream”, “The Asia Pacific Dream”, “The Belt and Road Initiative” and many more as part of its national strategy to increase its international image. China government implements its soft power policy for the purpose of achieving its ‘Chinese Dream’ goals and to become an advanced country by 2049. Similar to Western countries, soft power is one of China’s approaches to get recognition from other developing countries. As culture is seen as the most important part of soft power, China has been consistently pursuing its soft power through several tools such education exchanges, mass media, foreign aids, and Confucius Institutes.

MALAYSIA-CHINA RELATIONS

Despite the political coalition between ASEAN countries, Malaysia was the first country to establish

diplomatic relations with China in 1974. The process of the establishment of diplomatic ties began when the Chairman of Perbadanan Malaysia Berhad (PERNAS) Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah visited China in May 1971.¹⁵ The second Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak quoted that the trade mission marked the beginning of a "people to people friendship" between the two countries.¹⁶ The Chinese delegation visit to Malaysia on a trade mission and the 'Ping Pong Diplomacy' in 1974 further strengthened the early stage of establishing diplomatic relations. Negotiations on the establishment of Malaysia-China diplomatic relations lasted for several months from June 1973 to 1974. Representative from each side, Zakaria Ali and Huang Hua met 14 times to discuss issues such as the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), the overseas Chinese with dual citizenship, one-China policy and the use of the term 'China'. In short, the Malaysian government asked the Chinese government to stop supporting and providing any financial assistance or weapons to the Malayan Communist Party. Malaysia claims that this Communist policy struggle is capable of overthrowing the Malaysian government and indirectly became an obstacle to this diplomatic relationship.

After reaching an agreement, Tun Abdul Razak visited China from May 28 to June 2 1974, with the presence of Zhou Enlai and Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong. 31 May 1974 marked the beginning of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China when both parties successfully signed the Joint Announcement on the Establishment of China-Malaysia Diplomatic Relations at the Great Hall of the People of China.¹⁷ Although there were several political suspicions stirring between both countries in the 1980s and 1990s, economic ties remain the strongest foundation between the two countries, with China now being Malaysia's largest trade partner since 2009.¹⁸

BACKGROUND OF KONG ZI INSTITUTE

One of the most important instrument of China's soft power in Malaysia is the Kong Zi Institute of the University of Malaya (KZIUM). Established on November 1, 2009 with the cooperation between Beijing Foreign Studies University (BSFU) and University of Malaya, KZIUM was the first and the largest Confucius Institute in Malaysia. Initially,

KZIUM was set to be established in 2007. Though it is unclearly ascertained, the institute was officially launched two years later by China's Deputy Prime Minister Li Keqiang. KZIUM is the only institute bearing the name of Kong Zi instead of Confucius, due to 'Confucius' name was considered unacceptable in majority-Muslim Malaysia for allegedly propagating idolatry.¹⁹ After a thorough discussion to prevent misunderstanding or contentious issue in the future, both parties decided to use Kong Zi. The institute has been running for 11 years and had a separate building that occupies 1415 m² consisting of offices, classrooms, meeting rooms, library, auditorium, and a language lab. As of March 2021, the institute was governed by two Directors, Associate Professor Dr Noor Zalina Bt Mahmood (Malaysia) and Zhu Li (China). At the time of the interview, there were only 10 certified language teachers at the main campus, while others were back in China.²⁰ All classes were conducted online.

The institute devotes itself as a platform in fulfilling the demands of learning Chinese, teaching the Chinese language to non-native speakers and exposing Chinese cultural activities to Malaysia's local people.²¹ It offers a wide range of courses, ranging from HSK Level 1 to Level 6 and a compulsory Mandarin course at the Faculty of Arts and Social Science, University of Malaya. These courses were conducted for two hours twice a week, mostly aiming for the major ethnic Malay population. Unlike other CI in Malaysia, KZIUM does not only focus its teaching within the University of Malaya but outreach the teaching of Mandarin to other partners such as universities, schools, government agencies and private sectors. As of now, there are 41 native Chinese teachers who have been dispatched to 21 teaching sites in KZIUM, with a total of 16,362 teaching hours.²² The fact that KZIUM teachers teach outside of the main building does not mean that KZIUM runs regional branches. Rather these courses serve to enhance local offers of Chinese language instruction.²³

Table 1 shows the list of KZIUM teaching sites in 11 states except for Pahang and Sarawak. Mandarin classes were conducted in 17 public universities in each state respectively, two colleges and a secondary and primary school each. KZIUM had the highest demand among the UiTM universities, in addition to UiTM Sabah in

Table 1 List of KZIUM Teaching Sites

University/School	State
Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia (UPNM)	Selangor
Universiti Teknologi Mara (UiTM) Shah Alam	Selangor
UiTM Jengka	Pahang
UiTM Machang	Kelantan
UiTM Kedah	Kedah
UiTM Lendu	Melaka
UiTM Perlis	Perlis
UiTM Dungun	Terengganu
UiTM Perak	Perak
UiTM Sabah	Sabah
Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM)	Kedah
Kolej Universiti Islam Melaka (KUIM)	Melaka
Universiti Tun Hussien Onn (UTHM)	Johor
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM)	Johor
Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin (UNISZA)	Terengganu
Universiti Malaysia Kelantan (UMK)	Kelantan
Universiti Malaysia Perlis	Perlis
Politeknik Nilai	Negeri Sembilan
Sri Awaf Primary School	Negeri Sembilan
Kolej Yayasan Saad Melaka (KYSM)	Melaka
Sekolah Menengah Imtiaz, Ulul Albab, Melaka	Melaka


(Source: 2019 Annual Report of Kong Zi Institute University of Malaya)

East Malaysia. Sarawak had recently established the Confucius Institute at University College of Technology Sarawak (UCTS) in late 2020. Hitherto, KZIUM is well received among public universities since Confucius Institute Headquarter provides teaching staffs and funds, as well as native teachers, all of whom are willing to travel and offer classes away from the headquarters.

In addition, KZIUM insists on paying attention to community demands, constantly innovating the teaching content, and actively developing “Chinese+” courses.²⁴ For many years, it has cooperated with Maybank, PETRONAS, Malaysia Ministry of Home Affairs, Royal Malaysia Police, Immigration Department of Malaysia, ZTE Education Management Ltd in

China and offers tailor-made courses to serve these organization and the public.²⁵ This is how the institute tailor-made Mandarin language to fulfil the requirements of academics and fulfil the requirement of professionals.²⁶ To be able to pursue education in China, it is a requirement to pass the Chinese Proficiency Test. KZIUM offers three types of examinations: Chinese Proficiency Test (HSK), HSK Speaking Test (HSKK) and Youth Chinese Test (YCT).

Besides teaching Chinese, KZIUM also organised activities every year to promote Chinese culture and to increase students’ interest in learning Chinese and its culture. Among the activities organised were the Chinese Singing Competition, Chinese Bridge Proficiency Competition, Chinese Short Videos, cultural



(Source: 2019 Annual Report of Kong Zi Institute University of Malaya.)

Figure 1 Total number of student enrollment from 2010 to 2019

activities Chinese painting and calligraphy, Chinese film festival, food festival, various traditional cultural experience and academic conferences and forums, etc. According to KZIUM's annual report in 2018 and 2019, the number of participants had significantly increased every year while in the year of 2020, only several activities were conducted through online platforms. Furthermore, data acquired from KZIUM shows the increasing number of students each year. According to observation, the increasing number of students is due to student interests in Chinese language, China's popularity and sharing of information through social media contributes to this event. This shows that KZIUM is widely received and able to project its objectives among Malaysians.

Figure 1 presents the significant increase of the total enrollment in KZIUM since its establishment in 2010 until 2019. KZIUM started with only 300 students in 2010 and tremendously recorded a total amount of 12310 in 2019. This shows an increase of 12010 in the span of 10 years. In addition, the beginning of 2014 shows a sharp rise in total enrollment under the leadership of former Chinese Director Chen Zhong which the Institute began expanding its activities and scope of operation outside of the headquarters.²⁷ Furthermore, the expansion of teaching sites contributed to the growing number of students each year.

THE ROLE OF KONG ZI INSTITUTE AS A SOFT POWER

China's use of soft power as an approach to change views and perceptions about them is significant in an effort for them to increase their positive image. The Confucius Institute presented itself as an instrument in which China uses to pursue its foreign policy and increasing its international image. These institutions not only had an important part in promoting Chinese's culture and language but act as a symbol of friendship between both countries. Kong Zi Institute is one of the main pillars of China's cultural diplomacy in Malaysia, serving as an institution to promote understanding of the Chinese language and culture. KZIUM presents itself as a bridge or linkage of China's soft power through various ways such as promoting its culture, providing scholarships, enhancing bilateral relations and strengthen people to people exchange.

Culture is considered as a key resource of a nation's soft power. Through culture, KZIUM provides a better understanding of Chinese culture through its activities and appreciate Chinese people and their customs. Being in a multicultural environment in Malaysia, non-Chinese ethnics are well-familiar with Chinese traditions and customs, although they did not practice them. KZIUM provides interested students to experience Chinese culture and equipped them

with new knowledge and history of how it came to be. Although Chinese traditions and culture are well assimilated among Malaysians, there are fewer chances for them to experience these cultures wholly. This is because Chinese cultures in Malaysia were mainly practised among Chinese community only. Therefore, KZIUM aims to interact and introduce Chinese culture by letting them experience themselves, especially for the Malay community. Native teachers not only introduce Chinese traditional cultures but also allows students to experience it through activities, performance, competition, and various culture experience programs. Student were able to learn to practice calligraphy, painting, musical instruments and understand traditional Chinese festival culture by taking part in them. In 2019, KZIUM organised 14 Cultural Experience activities in various teaching sites. Among the activities are Chinese Culture Festival and Games Race in UTM, Chinese Culture Week in UiTM Sabah, Chinese Film Festival in UiTM Perlis, Lecture on Peking Opera Make-up, Paper Cutting and Culture Experience in UniMAP. These are some of the important measures to promote cultural exchange between China and Malaysia in addition to language teaching.

KZIUM consistently increases its cultural activities every year to attract more students and strengthen its role to promote Chinese culture. In the University of Malaya, KZIUM also organised a number of traditional Chinese festival celebration such as Mid-Autumn Festival and Chinese film festival, large-scale of activities and performance, culture experiences such as Tai Chi, Chinese calligraphy, Chinese painting, *Wei Qi* ('Go' Chess), *Gu Qin* (Chinese Musical Instrument) and various competitions. Among the most notable annual event organised by the institute was the Chinese Bridge Chinese Proficiency Competition. Participants were challenged with quizzes, speaking ability and talent shows related to Chinese culture such as singing, dancing, painting etc to win the favours of the judges. The winner will represent Malaysia at the international level in China. KZIUM reported these activities are well-received not only within Malaysians but attracted interests from foreigners as well.

Due to China's continuous growth, the biggest advantage in deploying its soft power is funds. It is

said that soft power would be more effective if a large sum of money were spent on it. China has accumulated US\$50 billion for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; US\$40 billion for the Silk Road Economic Belt; US\$25 billion for the Maritime Silk Road and US\$10 billion a year for its soft power campaign. China is fortunate to have resources and tools of soft power. But only having the resources is not enough to achieve goals as the ability of a country to employ its soft power is equally significant. As mentioned earlier, CI Headquarter provides starting fund and cover the expenses of teaching staffs and materials. The Confucius Institute Headquarter and China's Ministry of Education also accumulated a specific amount of money for the 'Confucius Institute Scholarship'. KZIUM works as a 'middle-man' between scholarship applicants and China. The applicants will apply for their scholarship of choice and KZIUM will review and process the applications to help applicants more efficiently. There are six types of scholarships: a 4-week Chinese language learning, One-academic-semester Chinese language learning, One-academic-year Chinese language learning scholarships, Bachelor's Degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages (BTCSOL), Master's Degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages (MTCSOL), and Scholarship for Students of One-Academic-Year + MTCSOL.²⁸ According to KZIUM's annual reports, the number of scholarship applicants has been increased each year to provide more opportunities to students who wish to pursue their studies in China and to enhance their Chinese skills. In 2019, KZIUM successfully recommended a total of 43 students for scholarships compared to the previous year, 11 applicants. According to Jonathan McClory, the co-author of the Soft Power 30 Index, education, and roles the university plays in attracting foreign student and providing global scholarships contributed to a country's soft power.²⁹ By offering scholarships, China sparks interest among international students to study in China. This can be seen as an effort or a long-term investment to win the hearts and minds of people to be in favour of China.

Although KZIUM is not an official ambassador of China, but the institute plays a significant role in enhancing the bilateral relations between the two countries especially in education sector. KZIUM hosted multiple events in collaboration with the Chinese Embassy,

Chinese organisations, and Chinese companies in Malaysia. For example, KZIUM collaborated with the China Enterprises Chamber of Commerce in Malaysia (CECCM) to organize a career fair, setting up “Chinese+ Vocational and Technical” course and ZTE Silk Road Scholarship with ZTE Education Management Ltd, China. The institute works as bridge to link up to those who wish to know about Malaysia and China’s bilateral relations. In addition, KZIUM supported organizations who wish to collaborate and cooperate not only in education, research, cultural and business through language courses and activities.³⁰ It is a small but essential measure provided by KZIUM in terms of bolstering its people to people exchange.

As China and Malaysia strengthen the educational cooperation between the two countries, KZIUM also strengthens people to people exchange better. Chinese education in Malaysia is well established without interruption since the early 1910s. There was already a solid foundation for learning Chinese in primary and secondary schools, with over 60 independent Chinese schools. Throughout the decades, Malaysia’s education policy had shifted from time to time, thus causing Chinese education to experience series of change and development. From our observation, KZIUM is getting appraised for its credibility due to its native Chinese teachers and authenticity of their traditional culture. Its primary aim is to teach Chinese as a second language. Their courses and teaching materials designed to fit the demands of learning Chinese as a second language, targeting mostly the Malay population.

As we are aware, Malaysia is a multicultural country with Chinese as the second largest population, and it is obvious there are many professional local Chinese teachers. Local Chinese teachers targeted group were mostly in Chinese primary or secondary schools, but KZIUM’s targeted group consists of mainly universities and government organisations. Both have different teaching materials and methods for teaching Chinese as a first and second language, respectively. Although the local Chinese teachers have well established Chinese language learning in Malaysia, there are slight differences in their method and teaching materials. Native Chinese teachers had a solid foundation in teaching Chinese and equipped

with a Master’s degree in Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (TCFL) background. All teachers received professional training in teaching Chinese. The traditional way of teaching language, including memorising, reciting, and writing practice, were mostly used by the local Chinese teachers. But native teachers implement a more fun and interesting way of teaching in order for the students to learn faster in a short period of time. They were assigned with creating a skit, group discussion and presentation, all in Chinese in Chinese to motivate them to speak the language themselves.³¹ These methods help them to learn faster in a fun way. The teachers also use textbooks such as “HSK Standard Course”, “Happy Chinese” and “Basic Mandarin” provided from the mainland.

In addition, KZIUM also offered a ‘tailor-made Course’ to the Royal Malaysian Police and Immigration Department of Malaysia according to their working environment needs, so the students could use it in their work context.³² The institute also brings opportunities for non-Chinese speaking Malaysians to understand China and explore China, working as a platform to visit China or pursuing higher education. If we made efforts to learn the language, not only we are able to understand their culture, but we are most probably able to collaborate with them better in every way. As a result, both parties are able to share and exchange cultural experience.

CONCLUSION

This year marks the 12th anniversary of KZIUM establishment in Malaysia. The institute has also been named as the “Confucius Institutes of the Year” in 2019 beating more than 563 global Confucius Institute for the title. Before, there were already institutions like INTAN (National Institute of Public Administration) offered Mandarin courses and various Chinese dialect to government officials and higher institutions in a small number of participants. The presence of KZIUM had significantly impacted INTAN as KZIUM is able to offer classes to large numbers of participants. Thus, decreasing the role and classes offered by INTAN as it overlapped with each other. On top of that, by bringing native teachers from the mainland and offering internationally recognised HSK, KZIUM indirectly seized job opportunity for

the local Chinese teachers. Additionally, this paper highlights the role of KZIUM in strengthening China's foreign policy in Malaysia. For the span of 10 years, KZIUM had served its purpose as an important tool to promote China. This paper's findings contribute significantly to society in providing a better understanding of the purpose of KZIUM establishment in Malaysia. It will also contribute to being another addition to the study of China's soft power by understanding its meaning in the context of the Confucius Institute.

In conclusion, as part of China's foreign policy approach, KZIUM had an agenda – to serve as a tool to increase China's positive image. The presence of the Confucius Institute in Malaysia was merely upon request by the local institutions. The increasing number of students and the establishment of new CIs in Malaysia indicate that this institute is gaining popularity. Unlike Western countries, the Confucius Institute in Malaysia is well received without receiving any criticism or defined as a threat to the government. As said, it is still an early stage to claim the effectiveness of this initiative due to several ongoing current issues regarding the South China Sea, Xinjiang conflict, Hong Kong protest that might affect Malaysian perspective towards China.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ The term refers to the literature, arts, architecture, and education of China.
- ² *Hanban*, in Chinese *Guojia hanyu guoji tuiguang lingdao xiaozu bangongshi* (国家汉语国际推广领导小组办公室) is a non-profit organization serves as Confucius Institute Headquarters. Originally, *Hanban* was known as the Office of the Chinese Language Council International when it was first established. Over the years, the Confucius Institute had experienced a series of name change. In 2013, it was added CI HQ to its name becoming *Hanban* (CI HQ) in the beginning of 2008. In 2019, it was changed to Centre for Language and Education.
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- ¹⁹ Hrubý, J. & Petrů, T. (2019). China's cultural diplomacy in Malaysia during Najib Razak's premiership. *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, 12(1), 111-129.
- ²⁰ Due to the worsen outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, native Chinese teachers were unable to travel abroad due to strict compilation from both Malaysia and China's government. All classes and activities are to be conducted online since March 2020.
- ²¹ Interview with Dr Zalina, Malaysia Director of the KZIUM, February 25, 2021.
- ²² Annual Report 2019 of Kong Zi Institute of University of Malaya.
- ²³ Petru, T. (2021). Two Confucius Institutes and a Cross Border University as Sites of China's Cultural Diplomacy in Malaysia: The Limitations of 'Domestic Structures'. In: Ptáčková J., Klimeš O., Rawnsley G. (eds) *Transnational Sites of China's Cultural Diplomacy*. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5592-3_6
- ²⁴ Annual Report 2019 of Kong Zi Institute of University of Malaya
- ²⁵ Each organization were offered different Mandarin courses according to their needs in results of both party's discussion. For example, the Royal Malaysian Police were offered a tailor-made course 'Chinese + Police Service' including basic Chinese communication and focuses more on police service. This is to improve their ability of using Chinese enquiry to suit their working environment. In 2019, KZIUM also conducted Intensive Chinese Course for PETRONAS scholarship students to study in China.
- ²⁶ Interview with Dr Zalina, Malaysia Director of the KZIUM, February 25, 2021.
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